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STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Appellant, Spokane Structures, Inc., a Washington Corporation ("SPOKANE
STRUCTURES") and Equitable Investments, a.k.a System Technologies (collectively
"EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS") entered into an "agreement" to design and build an office for
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS in Hayden, Idaho. SPOKANE STRUCTURES was proceeding
with its obligations under the "agreement," but EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS repudiated the
"agreement" prior to commencement of actual construction, causing loss to SPOKANE
STRUCTURES both for the services invested as well as the preparations made to commence
with the construction of the building.
SPOKANE STRUCTURES brought an action against EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
for specific performance and/or damages for breach of contract; or in the alternative for just
compensation and damages under the common law equitable remedies including quasi-contract,
unjust enrichment, restitution, implied-in-fact contract, and promissory estoppel. SPOKANE
STRUCTURES demanded a jury trial consistent with its right under the Idaho and United States
Constitution.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that SPOKANE STRUCTURES did not fulfill a condition precedent; i.e.,
limiting the construction cost to $605,000.00. And, therefore, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
was entitled to unilaterally cancel the "agreement."
The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS; not based on EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS's claim that SPOKANE
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STRUCTURES's estimate exceeded the $605,000.00 figure, thus relieving EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS of its obligation, but because the District Court concluded that the Agreement
did not obligate EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS to perform from the very beginning. In short,
the District Court ruled that the agreement was a legally binding and enforceable contract, but
that EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS had no duty to perform under the legal and enforceable
"agreement." SPOKANE STRUCTURES filed the present appeal contesting the District Court's
ruling.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

This appeal presents seven issues:
1.

Did the District Court err in holding that the heart of this issue is a breach of contract?
The District Court erred as a matter oflaw in narrowly ruling that the case involved only
the question of whether or not there was a breach of a contract. The complaint in this
case included numerous alternative claims that were not addressed by the District Court
in the summary judgment proceedings.

2.

Did the District Court err in holding that the contract is clear and unambiguous? The
District Court erred, as matter of fact and law, by failing to objectively assess the
documentary evidence, testimony, and contradictory interpretations offered in holding
that the contract is clear and unambiguous.

3.

Did the District Court err in holding that an express contract which does not require any
performance by one party is a valid contract? The District Court erred, as a matter of
law, in holding that the contract, while requiring one party to perform but not the other
party was a legal binding agreement.

4.

Did the District Court err in holding that no equitable remedies lie in the matter? In the
absence of any contractual obligation by EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS, one must
question the existence of a contract. If no contract existed, then SPOKANE
STRUCTURES should be entitled to equitable remedies.

5.

Did the District Court draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party?
In essence, the District Court, upon review of numerous affidavits and other evidence,
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made all reasonable conclusions in favor of the moving party in order to infer that the
contract did not obligate EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS to perform.
6.

Did the District Court liberally construe all facts of record in favor of the nonmoving
party? The District Court construed facts of the record in favor of EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS, disregarding the counter facts of SPOKANE STRUCTURES.

7.

Did the District Court err in finding no contested issues of material facts? Finally, the
District Court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that no contested issues of material fact
exist, when the evidence on record, memorandums submitted and the arguments offered
by the parties showed ample cause for a contrary finding.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The contract pertains wholly to a commercial transaction, and pursuant to LC. § 12120(3), SPOKANE STRUCTURES should be awarded its costs and attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
The Standard of Review on Appeal
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Supreme Court's standard of
review is the same as the standard used by the District Court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691,695 85 P.3d 667,
671 (2004); McDonald v. Paine, 119 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes
v. Meridian Athletic, 105 Idaho 509,670 P.2d 1294 (1983). Summary judgment is appropriate if

the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c); McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991); G & M
Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Brown v. Matthews
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Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830,801 P.2d 37 (1990). The Supreme Court is required to peruse,

review and consider the totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings and attached
exhibits contained in the record. Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P .2d 171
(1986). The Court is also required to liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793,
134 P.3d 641,644 (2006). Further, this appeal concerns the terms ofa contract that Appellant
claims are ambiguous. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question oflaw over which the
Supreme Court exercises free review. Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 175 P.3d
748 (2007).

1.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NARROWLY
RULING THAT THE CASE INVOLVED ONLY THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A BREACH OF A CONTRACT.

The complaint in this case included numerous alternative claims that were not addressed
by the District Court in the summary judgment proceedings. Given the inherent conflict between
the parties' respective interpretations of the obligations assumed in the "Design/Build
Agreement" and the subsequent communications, it was an oversimplification for the District
Court to rule that the entire agreement was contained in the one-page agreement executed by the
parties. And an oversimplification to the rule that the terms imposed an obligation only on one
party; and that, consequently, there could be no breach by the other party; and, therefore no
remedy for the party who did perform.
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First, the Design/Build Agreement did not exist in a vacuum. There were numerous
follow-up communications between the parties. 1 These communications did not take place as
afterthoughts; but were obviously an extension, a continuation, or amendment of the
"Design/Build Agreement" and its deliberately broad terms. Deliberately broad in order to
establish an agreement between the parties, but at the same time providing the flexibility to hit a
moving target.2 As set forth below, the contract between the parties, in particular the
Design/Build Agreement executed by both parties, clearly amount to an agreement that
accomplishes more than just obligating SPOKANE STRUCTURES to provide plans and
designs. There are simply too many other terms identifying other aspects of the construction
project to interpret the agreement as a contract for providing designs.
The District Court's interpretation that there was no obligation on the part of
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS, and the granting of summary judgment on that basis, reflects a
gross oversimplification of the facts and law in this case.

2.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS MATTER OF FACT AND LAW, BY
HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.
The District Court ruled that the contract between the parties is a clear and unambiguous

contract. This is a clear contravention of the language of the relevant documents, and the
conflicting claims made by the parties. For instance, there are at least four important
contradictory claims of interpretation and construction made by SPOKANE STRUCTURES and
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS about the "Design/Build Agreement."

1
2

CR 148 through 160
CR 073 through 074
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a) SPOKANE STRUCTURES and EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS strongly disagree as to
the meaning of the $605,000.00 term contained in the Design/Build Agreement. While
SPOKANE STRUCTURES contends that the figure may have been a cap with which
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS could govern its obligations and/or costs, subject to later
agreement between the parties, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS claims that the contract
between the parties was expressly contingent upon the ability to construct the office for
$605,000.00 or less. This was EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS' claim in spite of the
existence of the change order provisions contained in the "Design/Build Agreement."
b) There is no agreement regarding the implication of the financing contingency; whether
acquiring financing alone was the contingency provision or $605,000.00 and/or change
order language were also meant to be contingencies.
c) SPOKANE STRUCTURES contends that the contract is for both designing and
constructing the building, whereas the conflicting interpretation by EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS is that the contract was only meant to draw designs and the construction
part was dependent upon providing satisfactory designs and approval by the City.
d) SPOKANE STRUCTURES contends that the plans submitted were not final and that
they were subject to change until designs were accepted by EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS. SPOKANE STRUCTURES contends that this fact is evident from the
change order language of the "Design/Build Agreement," and the oral and e-mail
communications between the parties. EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS claimed that the
moment SPOKANE STRUCTURES submitted any document containing a figure in
excess of $605,000.00, then the contract became voidable at the option of EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS.
While there is no agreement or consensus between the parties concerning the
interpretation of these important points, the District Court subscribed to the interpretations
offered by EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS, or relied on its own interpretations and held that the
contract was clear and unambiguous. The issue of whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a
question oflaw to be determined by the courts. 3 The test in determining ambiguity is to ascertain

3

see Ramco v. H-K Cont,actors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P.2d 1381 (1990); DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63,
714 P.2d 32 (1986); Pocatello Industrial Park, Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P.2d 399 (1980); Prouse
v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App.1989).
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whether the contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. 4 "The substantial intent
of the parties governs in interpreting contracts, and this is to be detennined in view of the
agreement as a whole, the matters with which it deals and the circumstances under which it was
made. " 5 As set forth below, the contract between the parties consisted of a Design/Build
Agreement, as well as volleys of emails and phone conversations in relation to the design and
planning tenns, as well as the involvement of the City of Hayden Building Department, and even
the change orders as referenced in the "Design/Build Agreement." In consideration of the
numerous variables set forth in the "Design/Build Agreement," it is impossible to restrict the
intent of the parties to a one-sided obligation. The "Design/Build Agreement" is the beginning
of the contract, not the final word as to the obligations of the parties. Inquiry must be made into
the further negotiations and communications between SPOKANE STRUCTURES and
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS. The District Court refused to make these inquires, or to have
adequate review of all portions of the "agreement."
Further, while any given word or phrase, in itself, may not have been, in the opinion of
the District Court, subject to more than one interpretation, the conflict among several of the
tenns and phrases in the contract, do render otherwise clear tenns ambiguous. This conflict of
tenns is more fully addressed below, and in consideration of these conflicts, it was error for the
District Court to deem the contract clear and unambiguous.
4

Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338, 766 P.2d 1219 (1988); Delancey v. Delancey, I 10 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d
32 (1986).
5
Caldwell State Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 49 Idaho 110, 286 P. 360 (1930), citing Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313,
119 N. E. 559, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 247; Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho, 97, 117 P. 122, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 313, Ann.
Cas. 1912D, 1114. See also, Clarke v. Blackfoot Water Works, 39 Idaho 304,228 P. 326 (1924); Wilson v. Fackrell,
54 Idaho 515, 34 P.2d 409 (1934); Bratton v. Morris, 54 Idaho 743, 37 P.2d 1097 (1934).
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Further, if the contract between the parties is ambiguous, the District Court should have
been required to inquire into the intent of the parties and the object of the transaction. "In
construing an ambiguous contract, the object to be attained should be given prime
consideration. "6 The object of the transaction in the instant case is not nearly so elusive as the
negotiated terms and their meaning. The object of the transaction was to construct an office
building. This is clear. The ambiguity resides in the details. When there is an ambiguous
contract, to determine the intent of the parties, it may be imperative to consider the surrounding
circumstances out of which the provision arose. 7 The surrounding circumstances in the instant
case include the conversations and e-mail communications that followed the execution of the
Design/Build Agreement.
The District Court held that the contract is meant for design, engineering and drafting
plans for construction, but not for actual construction since there is no language in the
Agreement to obligate EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS to enter into an agreement to construct
the building. This is a conclusion not even posed by EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS.
Throughout its briefing and affidavits, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS acknowledged that there
was a mutually obligatory contract; but it only asserted that it was relieved of its obligation to
perform based on one of the terms. The District Court's interpretation is only one reasonable
interpretation. The other rational and reasonable interpretation is that the contract is not limited
to design engineering and planning for the reasons stated below.
6

Glover v. Spraker, 50 Idaho 16,292 P. 613,616 (1930)
Sauve v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 29 Idaho 146, 158 P. 112 (1916); Mark P. Miller Milling Co. v. ButterfieldElder Implement Co., 32 Idaho 265, 181 P. 703 (1919); Wood River Power Co. v. Arkoosh, 37 Idaho 348,215 P. 975
(1923)
7
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(i)

The contract is titled "Design/Build Agreement" as opposed to only a design
agreement. If the purpose of the agreement was just designing, engineering and
planning and not a construction agreement, then the word "build" would not have
been included.

(ii)

The very first sentence of the Agreement, the object provision reads as, "This
Agreement between SPOKANE STRUCTURES INC. and
SYSTEMTECHNOLOGIES sets forth the scope of work to be performed by
SPOKANE STRUCTURES, INC. in the design and construction of an office and
warehouse .... " The object of the agreement as stated in the first sentence is to
both design and construct the office and warehouse. Therefore, the District Court
erred in concluding that the agreement unambiguously is limited purpose of
designing, engineering and drafting plans.

(iii)

The District Court's determination that the unambiguous contract does not require
any construction but yet the agreement refers to change orders. The document
states: Change orders will be handle (sic) in writing only, and billed at cost of
change plus 20% for profit and overhead." This language has two implications:
that the $605,000.00 amount is not final, and that the parties engaged in building
construction negotiations. Hence, the District Court's interpretation that the
specification of the party's rights and obligations is unambiguous is erroneous.

(iv)

By far the most important clause ignored by the District Court is, "Billing for
construction will be monthly progress billing on the percentage of completion
method." This clearly proves that a reasonable interpretation of the "agreement"
is that SPOKANE STRUCTURES and EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS had an
"agreement" on building and that the billing was to be monthly on the basis of
percentage of completion. There would be no need for either of the parties to
incorporate this clause into the agreement unless there was a clear intent by both
parties that SPOKANE STRUCTURES would construct the building.

The District Court's ruling would render approximately half of the Design/Build
Agreement extraneous, at best, and nonsensical at worst. The District Court erred, as matter of
Jaw, in failing to interpret the contract as a whole. The District Court erroneously concluded that
the contract was unambiguous and only involved a limited purpose of design.
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Further, the District Court erroneously concluded that EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
did not breach the contract based on one single sentence of the contract that was meant to list the
scope of SPOKANE STRUCTURES' work. The District Court held that since there was no
express language to obligate EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS to enter into a construction
contract, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS is not in breach of the Design/Build Agreement. In

Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130; 540 P.2d 792 (1975), that court addressed the
absence of a term relating to construction of a radiant heating system. There, an original lease
agreement made no provision for the inclusion of radiant heating. There was a claim that since
there was no language in these w1itings defining a duty to deliver a functioning radiant heating
system, the court should have directed a verdict in its favor. The lower court found, and the
Supreme Court agreed, that there was nowhere in the contract where such a duty was expressly
spelled out, but rejected the appellant's argument that there was no ambiguity to present the
matter for construction by the jury. In Werry, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision to find the contract ambiguous and to tum the issue over to the jury. This was the
finding in spite of the fact that there was no express inclusion of the radiant heating term in the
original contract. The lower court, and Supreme Court observed that the letters and
correspondence between the parties subsequent to execution of the original agreement, raised the
potential for ambiguity in the dealings of the parties. Id. at 136.
As in Werry v. Phillips, the contract in this case does not by express language indicate the
precise terms by which completion of the contract could be determined. However, the contract
strongly alludes to terms by which a court could determine that both parties intended to
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accomplish the construction of a building for a price. This potential is further supported by the
conduct of the parties orally, and through e-mail communications. For instance, the contract
references "change orders" and "monthly billings in proportion to the percentage of completion."
These terms clearly establish that the parties did intend to construct the building. Therefore,
SPOKANE STRUCTURES was justified in believing that EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
intended to proceed with the construction contract, and was justified in rendering services and
providing goods in reasonable anticipation of compensation. In case of ambiguity as to the
meaning of the words of a contract, a party will be held to that meaning which he knew the other
party supposed the words to bear. 8
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS' decision not to proceed with the construction contract
could be determined in a trial to be a breach of contract. According to Idaho law, "rescission of
a contract is available only when one of the parties has committed a material breach which
destroys the entire object of entering into the contract and which touches the fundamental
purpose of the contract." First Security Bank ofIdaho v. Murphy; 131 Idaho 787; 964 P. 2d 654
(1998) In a trial, the trier of fact could find that EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS may rescind the
contract only where SPOKANE STRUCTURES committed an act that destroys the purpose of
the entire project, but no such occurrence took place. EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS asked
SPOKANE STRUCTURES to revise the original plans; likewise, EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS could have asked SPOKANE STRUCTURES to further modify the plans to be
within the allocated budget of $605,000.00 instead of rescinding the contract. Since SPOKANE
8

Penn Star Min Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343,231 P. 107 (1924), and cases cited. See also Stee/duct Co. v. HengerSeltzer Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 475, 123 P.2d 100 (1942)
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STRUCTURES did not commit any act to render the project unviable, then a trial should ensue
to determine whether EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS is in breach of the Agreement, or whether
equitable relief is appropriate.

3.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN HOLDING
THAT THE CONTRACT, WHILE REQUIRING ONE PARTY TO PERFORM
BUT NOT THE OTHER PARTY, WAS A LEGAL BINDING CONTRACT.
A very important dichotomy in the District Court's ruling relates to the District Court's

interpretation that the while the Agreement did not obligate one of the parties to perform; it was,
nevertheless, a binding contract. In the case of Thomas v. Cate, 78 Idaho 29, 296 P.2d 1033
(1956), the Supreme Court ofldaho recognized that a contract without some articulable
obligation to perform was not a contract at all, but was illusory. The Thomas Court stated, in
part:
Plaintiff bases his complaint on an alleged breach of an express contract, but the
contract does not set out an obligation assumed by the defendants, as above
pointed out. Among the requisites of a complaint for breach of contract are
allegations of the making of the contract, an obligation assumed by defendants,
and their breach or failure to meet such obligation, Stone v. Bradshaw, 64 Idaho
152, 128 P.2d 844 (1942), Am Jur, Contracts, sec. 388, pp. 964-965.
In the case of Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., 132 Me. 94, 167A.79, 81, 92 A.L.R.
1391, 1394, the court stated:
There is no more settled rule of law applicable to actions based on
contracts than that an agreement, in order to be binding, must be
sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine its exact
meaning and fix exactly the legal liability of the parties..... And a
reservation to either party of an unlimited right to determine the
nature and extent of his performance renders his obligation too
indefinite for legal enforcement, making it, as it is termed, merely
illusory.
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It is stated in 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, sec. 64, p. 555:
Damages cannot be measured for the breach of an obligation when
the nature and extent of the obligation are unknown, being neither
certain nor capable of being made certain.
The terms and conditions are not sufficiently definite unless the
court can determine therefrom the measure of damages in the case
of a breach. [A ]n agreement for service must be certain and
definite as to the nature and extent of the service to be performed,
the place where and the person to whom it is to be rendered, and
the compensation to be paid or it will not be enforced.
See also 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, sec. 66, p. 558.
Thomas at 31.
The Thomas Court goes on to state that: "The law will not hold a party bound to a
contract against his will, when the substance of what he is to get in return is executory, and is so
shadowy in its outline that the other party can refuse to perform with impunity, since either the
contract does not compel it, or no court can say what damage it has caused if it fail to act." Id. at
31. The Thomas court ruled that there was no enforceable contract.
The ruling of the District Court in the instant case was that: 1) there was, as a matter of
law, a legally binding contract, but 2) there was no legal obligation imposed on EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS. The District Court, at the March 12, 2008 hearing on motion for summary
judgment stated, in part, as follows:
But the contract itself does not, in fact, obligate the defendant to actually enter
into an agreement. 9

9
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Even ifwe had the typical contract that Mr. Lewis was using and didn't have that
threshold amount in it, I still don't think that the contract by its terms obligates the
defendant to basically enter into a contract to purchase the services to construct
this building. 10
Again, the clear and express language of the agreement does not call for the
defendants, again, to be bound ultimately by any specific terms that may have
been breached. II
As the analysis in Thomas reveals, a contract without an obligation cannot be an
enforceable contract. Where there is no enforceable contract, there is no contract at all.
Consequently, in the absence of a contract, SPOKANE STRUCTURES is entitled to pursue its
equitable claims against the Defendant, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS.
Further, if the Agreement is, indeed, a valid, enforceable contract, then the court erred in
not establishing the true intent of the parties. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that
implied contract terms should be read into a contract when necessary to establish the intentions
of the parties.
In every contract there exist not only the express promises set forth in the contract
but all such implied provisions as are necessary to effectuate the intention of the
parties, and as arise from the specific circumstances under which the contract was
made. 12
Further, "[P]rovisions not specifically mentioned in a written contract, but which are
essential in carrying out its purposes, may be implied, and, when properly implied, are as binding
as if written therein." Davis v. Professional Business Services, at 813, quoting Wiles. "Such
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Davis v. Professional Business Services, 109 ldaho 810, 712 P.2d 511 (1985), citing Miller v. Independent School
District No. 56 of Garfield County, 609 P.2d 756,758 (Okla.1980); and Wiles v. Wiles, 202 Kan. 613,452 P.2d 271,
278-79 (1969)
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implied terms are as much a part of the contract as those which are expressed." Id. at 814,
quoting Wiles.
The agreement is entitled: "Design/Build Agreement." This title, in itself, conflicts with
the conclusion reached by the District Court. It was concluded that the agreement identified an
obligation by SPOKANE STRUCTURES, but not EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS:

It provides that Spokane Structures agrees to design, which they apparently have
done; engineer, which they apparently have done; and draft plans in preparation
of all documents/drawings required to enable the owner and the contractor to
agree on a final design and cost of construction to be performed. That language in
and of itself is clear and unambiguous to the extent that it certainly commits
Spokane Structures to engage in efforts to design, engineer, and draft plans and
prepare documents for the purposes of enabling the parties to reach a final
agreement with respect to the cost of construction. 13
The District Court concludes that the Agreement does not obligate EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS. The first striking conflict of interpretation is contained in the very title of the
document, i.e., "Design/Build .... " If the Agreement is not an agreement to build something, why
is it so named? Further, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS executed the document. This, in itself,
would strongly indicate that both parties presumed an obligation on the part ofEQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS. Otherwise, it seems logical that SPOKANE STRUCTURES would have
simply presented the document as a bid, or an offer. In fact, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
strongly argued throughout these proceedings, and especially at the summary judgment hearing,
that there was a binding contract, but that a bid which exceeded $605,000.00 vitiated the
agreement, thus relieving EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS of its obligation to proceed with the
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document.
Consequently, the District Court's analysis conflicts with both of the parties'
interpretations. The requirement for determining whether a contract is or is not ambiguous, is
that it is subject to more than one interpretation. In this case, the there appears to be three
reasonable interpretations of the meaning of the "contract:" SPOKANE STRUCTURES',
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS', and the District Court's.

4.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BY HOLDING
THAT SPOKANE STRUCTURES SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO CLAIMS
FOR EQUITABLE REMEDIES.

As set forth elsewhere in this brief, the District Court held that SPOKANE
STRUCTURES is not entitled to any equitable remedies since the Design/Build Agreement is a
clear and unambiguous contract and, where there is a valid contract, the appropriate remedy is a
legal one. However, the District Court found that there was no possible legal remedy because
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS was not obligated to perform under the contract. As SPOKANE
STRUCTURES set forth in its summary judgment brief, quoting Albert Einstein, "Keep it
simple, but no simpler." In other words, just because there is a simple one page contract, with no
obvious and glaring phrases setting out all the rights and all the remedies of the parties, does not
mean that one party should be denied recompense for the wrongful actions of the other party.
Such a situation is precisely the reason that equitable remedies came into being.
Although there is the established principle oflaw that equity will not afford relief
to a plaintiff where there is an adequate remedy at law, " 'it is not enough that
there is a remedy at law; it must be plain and adequate, or, in other words, as
practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the
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remedy in equity.'" Rich v. Braxton, 158 U.S. 375,406, 15 S.Ct. 1006, 1017, 39
L.Ed. 1022 (1895) (citations omitted); see Am.Jur.2d Equity § 94 and cases cited
therein. The applicability of this rule depends on the circumstances of each case.
Equitable"[rlelief will be granted when in view of all the circumstances, to deny it
would permit one of the parties to suffer a gross wrong at the hands of the other
party, who brought about the condition." ( citations omitted). (Emphasis added)
Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,405 690 P.2d 333, 340 (1984).

In the instant case, SPOKANE STRUCTURES suffered siguificant damages at the hands
of EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS. 14 The District Court announced there was a contract without
an obligation and without a remedy. This cannot be. Equity's brightness must shine into the
dark void left by the District Court's ruling. Otherwise, our revered and vaunted court system
has rendered to SPOKANE STRUCTURES neither justice, nor fairness; nor even the
consolation of a determination of the facts in this case by a jury.
The District Court has erred in ruling that SPOKANE STRUCTURES is not entitled to
equitable remedies and dismissing the case. In a full and fair trial on the matter, the trier of fact
could determine that a contract does not exist, thus equitable remedies do exist.

S.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DRAWING REASONABLE INFERENCES
IN FAVOR OF THE MOVING PARTY, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS.
Although the terms "inference" and "construe" are somewhat similar in their legal sense,

there is a subtle difference, which must be drawn. The term "construe" relates more to
construction and interpretation of the meaning of the subject language; an analysis of the
meaning of the words and phrases when amassed in a document or instrument. The term "infer"

14
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relates more to the logical and/or intended conclusions to be drawn from the pertinent terms and
phrases.
Construe. To put together; to arrange or interpret the words of an instrument,
statute, regulation, court decision or other legal authority. To ascertain the
meaning of language by a process of arrangement, interpretation and inference.
See construction. 15
The relevant definition of"construction" is instructive:
Construction. The process, or the art, of determining the sense, real meaning, or
proper explanation of obscure, complex or ambiguous terms or provisions in a
statues, written instrument, or oral agreement, or the application of such subject
tot the case in question, by reasoning in the light derived from extraneous
connected circumstances or laws or writings bearing upon the same or a
connected matter. .. 16
The relevant definition of"inference" is:
Inference. A process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be
established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of
facts, already proved or admitted. A logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact
not presented by direct evidence but which, by process of logic and reason, a trier
of fact may concluded exists from the established facts. [citations omitted]
Inferences are deductions or conclusion which with reason and common sense
lead the jury to draw from facts which have been established by the evidence in
the case. 17

The District Court erroneously made conclusions of both fact and law in favor of
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS in violation of established law and precedent. The District
Court based its summary judgment on the conclusion that:
[T]here is an agreement between the parties to work and engage in good faith
toward reaching an agreement for the purpose of construction and having a
Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. - 2nd Reprint- 1990, page 315
Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. - 2nd Reprint- 1990, page 312
17
Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. - 2nd Reprint- 1990, page 778
15

16
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building on the defendant's property. But the contract itself does not, in fact,
obligate the defendant to actually enter into an agreement. 18
This a clearly a flawed conclusion based on one single sentence from the "Design/Build
Agreement" that states that "Spokane Structures Inc. agrees to design, engineer and draft plans in
preparation of all documents/drawings to enable the owner and contractor to agree on final
design and cost of construction to be performed." 19 The District Court failed to consider other
provisions that showed that the Agreement was also meant for construction of the building. The
District Court having concluded that the contract is clear failed to apply the law objectively with
respect to the parties.
Summary judgment shall be granted to the moving party "if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119
Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). In ruling upon a motion for summary
judgment, all disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
to be drawn in favor of the non- moving party. Bonz, 119 Idaho at 541, 808 P .2d
at 878. The burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests
at all times upon the moving party. G & MFarms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119
Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). However, to withstand a motion for
summary judgment, the non- moving party's case must consist of more than
speculation; it must create a genuine issue regarding a material fact. G & M
Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P .2d at 854. A mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough to create a genuine issue. Id.. Where, as here, a jury has been requested,
the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of reasonable inferences drawn
from the evidentiary facts. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P .2d 923
(1982); Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 110 Idaho 347-48, 715 P.2d 1017-18
(Ct.App. I 986). (Emphasis added)
East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 686,688, 837 P.2d 812, 814 (1991).
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The District Court did not draw all reasonable inferences in favor of SPOKANE
STRUCTURES. For example, Linda Tomblin for EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS acted as if
there was a requirement to build. In a 3/30/2007 email, Ms. Tomblin states, "Thanks, Rob. I
think the cost savings are likely to be better once you have the quotes in from Kimball Electric
and Advance Heating."20 An inference can certainly be drawn from Linda Tombin's concerns as
to the total cost of construction that she anticipated that the "contract" was not just for design but
also for construction. This reasonable inference was not drawn by the District Court.
Another example of an inference not made in favor of SPOKANE STRUCTURES, the
nonmoving party, is found in the reply email from Linda Tomblin to Rob Lewis' explanation of
why the bid from Bettis was $7,000 higher than the others. Ms. Tomblin states, "We haven't
signed the papers for the loan yet as I was waiting for you to re-quote .... " 21 The reasonable
inference from this statement is clearly that the agreement was for more than only design; the
bank was preparing a construction loan not a design loan.
Another example of an inference not made in favor of SPOKANE STRUCTURES, is
shown in the increase in the costs. In Linda Tomblin's deposition, she affirms her requests for
additional designs for improvements, the increased the cost to the building, adding a cantilevered
area, adding a belly board in a different color, etc. 22 The affidavit of Rob Lewis, president and
company representative for the project, explains some of the changes which included:
Although the changes requested by Linda Tomlin were very numerous, the
following are good examples of the kinds of changes requested:
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9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5

Increase the size of the finished square footage ...
Increase the number of windows ...
Increased the size of the parking lot ...
Add a pop out on the front office...
Add a "clean room"23

The reasonable inference from this statement is that EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
modified, amended or started a new "agreement" for a building not as originally planned to be
constructed, but clearly desired a different building, upgraded to reflect the business' success.
Another example of an inference not made in favor of SPOKANE STRUCTURES, is
indicated by the obvious presumption of increased price commensurate with ordering a new,
more complex design. As Rob Lewis stated in his affidavit:

JO.
I advised Linda that each of the changes would increase the cost of the
building, but she wanted the changes anyway.
11.
I sent the third draft of the plan, Exhibit "D," and I personally spent a
great deal of time amending the plans. We went through two complete plans.
True and accurate, but reduced, copies of those designs are attached as Exhibit
"C" and "D" to this affidavit. The new redesigned building had a cost of
$644,092.00. The work order ( exhibit 4 of Linda Tomblin deposition) is further
evidence of her requested changes and the related costs in accordance with the
spirit and wording of the design build agreement. This was just one more step in
a continuing design/build process. If Linda Tomblin desired to proceed with the
more expensive design as she desired in the design meetings, then the cost of the
construction would obviously be increased consistent with the change from the
original design. The $644,092.00 design was never "a take it or leave it"
situation, Spokane Structures could easily back off of that number if Linda
Tomblin desired.
12.
As an example of the ongoing negotiations and communications after the
presentation of the $605,000.00 bid, please note the following communications:

23
24
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24

12.1. Attached as Exhibit "E "is a true and correct copy of an email
dated January 22, 2007, in which Linda Tomblin acknowledged additions to the
overall project.
12.2. Attached as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of a fax dated
February 22, 2007, in which Linda Tomblin acknowledged that "We're
ready to rock and roll!" This was after the bid in excess of$605,000.00 was
presented and discussed. 25
The nonmoving party presented substantial facts, and the reasonable inferences from those
facts should have been drawn by the District Court. The District Court's failure to draw the
reasonable inferences is error and the dismissal should be reversed.

6.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CONSTRUE THE FACTS OF THE RECORD
IN FAVOR OF SPOKANE STRUCTURES.

Idaho law is abundantly clear on the preservation of the constitutional right to jury trial.
This court has recently reaffirmed this right in Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd.
Partnership,145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008), stating:

In making this determination, all allegations of fact in the record, and all
reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion." City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests
Ltd., 135 Idaho 239,243, 16 P.3d 915,919 (2000).

This procedural protection can be especially important in the analysis of contractual matters. As
this Court held in Jesse v. Lindsley, --- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 2313406 (Idaho 2008):
Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts.
Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107,110
(1970). A contracting party may absolve himself from certain duties and liabilities
under the contract, subject to certain limitations. Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T.
25
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Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175,178,595 P.2d 709,712 (1979). However, courts
look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability and construe such provisions
strictly against the person relying on them, especially when that person is the
preparer of the document. Id.

In the instant case, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS drafted the exculpatory and arguably
ambiguous clause, in regard to the $605,000.00, 26 This clause was the basis for the motion for
summary judgment. This Court should construe the clause strictly against EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS. The $605,000.00 "walk away" or "threshold" clause needed to speak clearly
and directly to the conduct to immunize EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS from contractual or
equitable liability. Clearly, the District Court did not construe the facts surrounding the contract
in the light most favorable to SPOKANE STRUCTURES.
Although the District Court claims that the interpretation of the $605,000.00 clause is not
necessary in the determination, the holding of the court is certainly ambiguous on this issue. The
District Court states:
And while I think that certainly is instrumental to the contract, because it did
provide a specific price which was not met, I'm not sure that's really necessarily
the determining factor." ...Again, the clear and express language of the
agreement does not call for the defendants, again, to be bound ultimately by any
specific terms that may have been breached. 27

If the clause is instrumental to the contract, why is it not a determining factor? It appears
that the District Court can make this conclusion because the District Court failed to
liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party, SPOKANE STRUCTURES.

26

27
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Although the above described issue is one of the more grievous errors, many other
failures to infer properly exist. For example, the District Court seems to construe many of the
facts in favor of the EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS in complete disregard of the facts put into
the record by SPOKANE STRUCTURES. The District Court delivered judgment by unilateral
subscription to the EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS' claims upon the interpretation of the
Design/Build Agreement. This Court's position on such matters is clear, in Foster v. Traut, 145
Idaho 24, I 75 P.3d 186 (2007):
All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonrnoving party,
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of the nonrnoving party. Id., 137 Idaho at 327, 48 P.3d at 656 (citing
Jacobson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 136 Idaho I 71, 173, 30 P.3d 949,951
(2001)) (emphasis added).
The District Court's flawed summary judgment is based on a series of factual lapses or
inferences construed in favor of the moving party. Some of the important facts ignored were as
follows:
i. The District Court read the contract such that it favored EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
while ignoring clauses that clearly strengthened the contentions of SPOKANE
STRUCTURES. 28

ii. The District Court ignored the fact that EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS proposed
changes and the increase in the construction amount was on account of including the
proposed changes into the construction estimates proposing alternate plans and
specifications. 29

iii. Linda Tomblin admitted that there were original plans, which were not acceptable, hence
changes were proposed. This fact reveals that SPOKANE STRUCTURES was expected
to prepare drafts that would be accepted or rejected but there were to be series of drafts to
28
29
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be provided until EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS finalized one of them. If this were not
the case, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS should have refcudiated the contract when
SPOKANE STRUCTURES provided the original plans. 0
iv. When EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS proposed changes, SPOKANE STRUCTURES
provided the revised changes with revised costs. SPOKANE STRUCTURES would have
no choice but to present an objective estimate for the proposed changes or else it would
have to quote Jess and incur losses or EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS has to further
modify or withdraw the proposed changes. 31
v. Unlike the first instance where EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS chose to propose
changes to the original plans, the second time around EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
chose to repudiate the contract while SPOKANE STRUCTURES was under the belief
that, if need be, there would be modifications both for design and cost. 32
The District Court did not construe the above facts liberally in favor of the nomnoving
party. In making factual findings, the District Court appears to have rather construed the factual
findings in the most favorable light to the moving party, EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS. As
this Court has held:
[A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be
denied if the evidence is such that one may draw conflicting inferences therefrom,
and ifreasonable people might reach different conclusions.

Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 179 P.3d 1064 (2008).
Hence, the District Court's judgment should be reversed.

7.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FINDING THAT
NO CONTESTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST, WHEN THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, MEMORANDUMS SUBMITTED AND THE
ARGUMENTS OFFERED BY THE PARTIES SHOWED AMPLE CAUSE FOR A
CONTRARY FINDING.
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In Idaho, there is no doubt that this Court has the right to review the District Court. We
first note that summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal,
we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App. 1986). Boots ex rel. Boots v. Winters,
145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 Idaho App.,2008.
This Court has clearly set a procedure for the determination of the whether genuine
material facts exist.
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404,848 P.2d
984, 988 (Ct.App. 1992). The burden may be met by establishing the absence of
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial.
Dunnickv. Elder, 126 Idaho 308,311,882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct.App. 1994). Such
an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with
the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's
evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v.
Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App. 2000).
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to
the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery
responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a
valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f).
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho at 874, 876 P.2d at 156 (1994).
Did the Defendant meet the burden to establish that there no genuine issue of material
fact existed?
Contract Claims:
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The Plaintiffs complaint was necessarily broad because of the unusual nature of the
relationship between the parties. The first and second counts were contractual claims. The
parties signed a document that certainly had characteristics of a contract. It was entitled a
"DESIGN/BUILD AGREEMENT (emphasis added)." The agreement required the parties to
work together to design and build a building for Systemstechnologies owned by Equitable
Investments, LLC. 33
There is no doubt that the "contract" is unusual in that the document seems to anticipate a
further contract and is not very specific in the requirements of the parties. It was uncontested
that Exhibit A to the complaint (Exhibit 25 of the Materials Submitted by Defendant) was the
"agreement" between the parties.
The next contractual uncontested issue according to EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS was
that the plans presented by SPOKANE STRUCTURES exceeded $605,000.00. Although the
amount was uncontested, facts related to the meaning of the phrase was a hotly contested
material issue for the contract question. SPOKANE STRUCTURES' last design did exceed the
$605,000.00 because of the requests of the negotiating principal of EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT. According to Rob Lewis' Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, paragraph 6:
Sometime prior to September 28, 2006, Linda Tomlin contacted Spokane
Structures, Inc. regarding a remodel of the subject property. Linda Tomlin
represented that her company, the tenant of the building, had grown to the point
that the structure needed to be upgraded to reflect the business' success and the
business' needs. Ms. Tomlin described the proposed remodel as essentially
33
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erecting a new building and connecting it to the existing structure. Linda Tomlin
presented Spokane Structures, Inc. with a prospective plan drafted by a Dave
Lansford, residential designer. 34
The contested genuine material issues existed in relation to whether the parties
orally amended the contract or if the parties did not treat the design as a violation of the
restriction.
The original Design/Build Agreement did not contain the phrase "not to exceed
$605,000.00." The original phrase that was deleted was more general, consistent
with the intent of the flexibility of the design-build concept. Linda Tomblin
represented that the phrase added by the attorney only related to the design as
existed on that date, so I had no concern with the substitution of the language
since Spokane Structures, Inc. could comfslete the remodel of the building as
illustrated in Exhibit A, for $605,000.00. 5
Contested material issues did exist, but far more bothersome is that the District Court
seemed to ignore all the parties' arguments and determining and relying on a totally different set
of"uncontested" issues. The District Court holds first, as a matter oflaw, that the contract is not
ambiguous. Even though the facts as discussed above show two reasonable and very different
interpretations, the District Court totally disregards EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS' argument
that the $605,000.00 was a walk away and SPOKANE STRUCTURES' interpretation that it
only applied to the initial design, a threshold. Instead, the District Court held that,
Now, there's been a Jot of discussion here and argument about the $605,000.00
threshold or walk away figure. And while I think that certainly is instrumental to
the contract, because it did provide a specific price which was not met, I'm not
sure that's really necessarily the determining factor." ... Again, the clear and
express language of the agreement does not call for the defendants, again, to be
bound ultimately by any specific terms that may have been breached." 36
34
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As discussed elsewhere, the District Court's conclusion brings many issues to the surface
that were not briefed or argued by the parties. This theory was not the moving party's basis for
the motion for summary judgment. The District Court acknowledges different interpretations of
the $605,000.00, a "threshold" according to SPOKANE STRUCTURES, and a "walk away
figure" according to EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS. The unfairness of the ruling is that the
material issue for this new argument is determined without giving SPOKANE STRUCTURES
an opportunity to rebut as allowed under Idaho law.
The affirmative showing by EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS as the moving party's own
evidence was keyed to the $605,000.00 "walk away." The responding showing by SPOKANE
STRUCTURES as the nonmoving party's evidence contested the conclusion by showing the
facts that the $605,000.00 was a "threshold" number for the plan originally presented, not the
plan requested to "reflect the business' success." If the moving party had made the argument of
the District Court, then the claim would need to be supported by uncontested facts related to that
new claim and SPOKANE STRUCTURES had the right and the obligation to present contested
genuine facts related to that issue. For example: Did the parties act as if EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS had no obligations? Did the parties intend that EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS
had no obligations? Each party would answer to these questions in the opposite, and both would
cite to facts to support their positions - obviously there were contested issues of material fact.
The right of the nonmoving party arises when the burden shifts. In this case, the District
Court changed the issues of the moving party and used a new theory to grant the summary
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judgment. SPOKANE STRUCTURES was left with no opportunity to show any contested
material facts related to the District Court's theory so as to avoid the dismissal.
Certainly the record cannot, under these circumstances, show clear uncontested facts
related to a theory that has never been briefed or argued. But the facts that were presented by
SPOKANE STRUCTURES, if construed liberally for the nonmoving party, are abundantly
sufficient to establish material issues of disputed fact which must be preserved for determination
by a jury. The motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS' Claims.
The "contract" as interpreted by EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS was clear and
unambiguous and enforceable, so no equitable rights could exist, based again on the
interpretation of the $605,000.00 as the "walk away" number. The District Court concluded:
Once the court has concluded that we have an unambiguous contract and has
concluded that the express terms of that contract do not obligate the defendant to
proceed with the construction plans, then there would be no equitable remedies
that would consequently lie in this matter, so we don't need to discuss those any
further. 37
SPOKANE STRUCTURES presented the Affidavit of Rob Lewis, president and
company representative for the project, which in part states:
In the subsequent discussions with Linda Tomlin, it became obvious that Linda
did not want to construct the remodel that was illustrated by Dave Lansford, see
Exhibit "A." In particular, she wanted to change the size and the aesthetics of the
building. Based on her requests, I prepared two plans and completed cost
estimates for the plans which included the paying for an architect, engineer and
substantial work of contacting subcontractors and material suppliers and
completing specifications. Although the changes requested by Linda Tomlin
37
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were very numerous, the following are good examples of the kinds of changes
requested:
9 .1
Increase the size of the finished square footage of the building by 5000
square feet. At a cost of $15.00 per square foot this equates to a $75,000.00 price
tag.
9.2
Increase the number of windows from 18 to 28 at a cost of$2,500.00.
9.3
Increased the size of the parking lot by 2054 square feet at a cost of
$35,945.00.
9.4
Add a pop out on the front office and change the timber frame entry from
the original entry at a cost of$4,000.00.
9.5
Add a "clean room" at a cost of$15,000.00.
10.
I advised Linda that each of the changes would increase the cost of the
building, but she wanted the changes anyway.
11.
I sent the third draft of the plan, Exhibit "D," and I personally spent a
great deal of time amending the plans. We went through two complete plans.
True and accurate, but reduced, copies of those designs are attached as Exhibit
"C" and "D" to this affidavit. The new redesigned building had a cost of
$644,092.00. The work order (exhibit 4 of Linda Tomblin deposition) is further
evidence of her requested changes and the related costs in accordance with the
spirit and wording of the design build agreement. This was just one more step in
a continuing design/build process. If Linda Tomblin desired to proceed with the
more expensive design as she desired in the design meetings, then the cost of the
construction would obviously be increased consistent with the change from the
original design. The $644,092.00 design was never "a take it or leave it"
situation, Spokane Structures could easily back off of that number if Linda
Tomblin desired.
12.
As an example of the ongoing negotiations and communications after the
presentation of the $605,000.00 bid, please note the following communications:
12.1. Attached as Exhibit "E "is a true and correct copy of an email
dated January 22, 2007, in which Linda Tomblin acknowledged additions to the
overall project.
12.2. Attached as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of a fax dated
February 22, 2007, in which Linda Tomblin acknowledged that "We're
ready to rock and roll!" This was after the bid in excess of $605,000.00 was
presented and discussed.
12.3. Attached as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy of an email
from me to Ms. Tomblin, dated March 30, 2007, reflecting communications and
concerns she had about increasing costs.
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12.4. Attached as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy of Ms.
Tomblin's response to Exhibit "G" dated March 30, 2007, which clearly
acknowledges my comments and discusses additional contractors, and makes no
mention of the higher bid having jeopardized the agreement.
12.5. Attached as Exhibit "I" is a true and correct copy of an email from
Ms. Tomblin, to me, dated April 5, 2007, which informs me that the loan papers
had not yet been signed because she was waiting for final bids from
subcontractors. No mention is made of the $605,000.00 limitation.
12.6. Attached as Exhibit "J" is a true and correct copy of an email from
Ms.
Tomblin to me, dated April 10, 2007, which confirms the ongoing
negotiations and mutual agreement as to progress on the project. The email also
acknowledges the need to present a final price, based on the final plans.
12.7. Attached as Exhibit "K" and Exhibit "L" are true and correct
copies ofmy emails, dated April 10, 2007, and April 15, 2007,, in which I
continue to update Ms. Tomblin as to the progress of the project.
12.8. Attached as Exhibit "M" is a true and correct copy of my email to
Ms. Tomblin in response to receiving a letter from her attomey. 38

It is evident from this excerpt from the Affidavit of Rob Lewis that the District Court
failed to appreciate the contradictory issues of material fact. The District Court concluded that
the unambiguous contract was for $605,000.00. If Linda Tomblin, on behalf EQUITABLE
INVESTMENTS, rejects the design at $605,000.00 and then asks for a redesign to "reflect the
business' success," then the party doing the additional work should get paid under and oral
amendment of the contract or in equity. The alternative claims deserve a full and fair trial. After
all, in Idaho, an individual has the right to be paid for improvements to the property occasioned
by his services. Here, there was additional work and benefit for the property. The District
Court's failure to recognize this genuine issue of material fact leads to unjust enrichment to
EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS.

38
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The District Court's conclusion that there exists no issue of material fact to be proved at
the trial is in error. The intent of the parties and interpretation of the contract are disputed. The
major disputes include the intent of the parties regarding whether or not there was an intention to
enter into a construction agreement, whether the contract has the limited purpose of designing,
engineering and drafting, whether the change order clause was meant for construction phase or
contingency provision (as claimed by EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS), and whether the
$605,000.00 was a threshold figure, and not a "walk away" figure. When there are conflicting
interpretations of the same agreement, the court has to look into the circumstances to ascertain
the intent of the parties. Therefore, the District Court in concluding that there is no issue of
material fact should be reversed and a full and fair trial should be allowed on all of the
alternative claims. As this court has concluded in Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co.,145 Idaho
408, 179 P.3d 1064 (2008):
The existence and terms of the contract here are not clear-these are all disputed
facts. When the existence of a contract is in issue, and the evidence is conflicting
or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a
contract in fact exists. Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,368,679
P.2d 640,645 (1984). Thus, because the parties dispute whether there was a
contract and, if so, what its duration was, there were factual issues that should
have been presented to a jury for determination. The district court erred when it
granted summary judgment on Mackay's breach of contract claim.
The District Court erred in concluding that there were no disputed issues of material fact,
and the District Court should be reversed and a full and fair trial should be allowed on all of the
alternative claims.
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CONCLUSION

There was a valid, legally binding contract between the parties herein, or there was not.
If there was a legal contract, then pursuant to the law of Idaho, both parties must have been

subject to mutual obligations; obligations that could be breached; breaches for which the courts
provide a legal remedy. If there was not a legal contract, then the parties are afforded the
opportunity to pursue equitable claims under Idaho law.
One of these scenarios applies to the case at bar. Both cannot be correct, and both cannot
be incorrect. In either case, the District Court's granting of summary judgment on the grounds
articulated is in error and the Judgment must be overruled. Therefore, SPOKANE
STRUCTURES requests this honorable court to vacate the District Court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of EQUITABLE INVESTMENTS and remand the case for trial.
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